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   Features of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program and the social 
security retirement system interact to create incentives for prospective participants in the 
aged portion of SSI to withdraw from the labor force and make an early old age insurance 
(OAI) claim under social security.  This paper takes a first close look at this SSI-OAI 
interaction.  The work disincentives posed by SSI rules and the potential interactions 
between the SSI and social security programs are outlined in a basic theoretical 
framework.  The impact of SSI rules on the financial cost of delaying the initial OAI 
claim is calculated using earnings records of actual SSI recipients.  Regression 
specifications for early OAI claims that include variables intended to capture the 
influence of SSI are estimated.  Throughout, the analyses are enhanced by access to 
Social Security Administration records that have been matched to individuals in the 
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I.  Introduction 
Perhaps because individuals only become eligible for the Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) program at age 65, there has been little investigation of the possible incentive effects on 
behavior prior to age 65, including diminished work and increased participation in other 
programs.  In fact, the incentives imbedded in SSI could lead individuals to withdraw from the 
labor market at earlier ages, and interactions between SSI rules and the early retirement option in 
the social security system reinforce these incentives.  This study is the first of which we are 
aware to empirically investigate how behavior is affected by these program interactions 
(preliminary work on this issue appeared in Powers and Neumark, 2001).
1  The theory laid out 
below predicts that they will, but this is under an assumption of knowledge of these government 
programs on the part of their actual and prospective participants.  Only an empirical analysis can 
confirm whether these interactions are important in practice.  We use multiple panels of the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), linked to confidential Social Security 
Administration data on earnings histories, beneficiary status, and SSI recipiency, to investigate 
this issue.
2   
Since its inception in 1974, the SSI program has been subject to two major criticisms 
with regard to its treatment of the aged (Burkhauser and Smeeding, 1981).  These are the 
inequitable treatment of social security contributors who eventually become SSI participants and 
the disincentives generated by the design of the program's means test.  Although many SSI 
recipients have contributed substantially to the social security system throughout their working 
lives, their net government retirement benefit is weakly related to contributions.  In fact, SSI 
recipients who qualify for social security benefits are entitled to a government transfer no more 
than $20 per month greater than that of a lifetime noncontributor to the social security system.  
                                                 
1 We note at the outset that there is a statutory relationship between SSI receipt and social security receipt, 
because SSI recipients are required to claim their social security entitlements.  This phenomenon is not 
generated by individual behavior, and it is not the focus of this paper.   
2 Throughout the paper we use the terms "SSI" and "SSI-aged" interchangeably to refer to the program for 
which sufficiently poor elderly qualify.  We use the term "SSI-disabled" to distinguish the disability 
portion of the program.   2   
While equity and incentive issues are intimately related, in this paper our direct focus is on 
incentives.   
Burkhauser and Smeeding (1981) identify four major effects of SSI on behavior.  First, 
SSI effectively places a confiscatory tax on retirement income exceeding small disregards, 
regardless of whether it is from private or public sources.  This includes income from social 
security.  Therefore a potentially important incentive for working today–additional pension 
income tomorrow–is eliminated by SSI rules.
  Second, SSI creates additional incentives for early 
retirement through its interaction with social security retirement rules.  This occurs because the 
usual financial implications of making an early old age insurance (OAI) claim are nullified once 
the individual enters the SSI program.
3  Third, workers who think they will qualify for SSI later 
in life have an incentive to avoid paying social security taxes, since they receive little or no credit 
for these additional "contributions."  Finally, SSI's asset test discourages saving.  Note that this 
reduced need for private saving also reduces the labor supply needed to meet saving goals.   
In earlier work (Neumark and Powers, 1998, 1999, 2000) we provide evidence that 
prospective SSI recipients respond to disincentives to work and save as they approach the age of 
SSI-aged eligibility.  While we have speculated in past work that a by-product of decreased work 
may be a desire to make an earlier OAI claim (in order to meet consumption needs despite a 
reduction in labor supply), in this paper we go further to fully explore the interactions between 
the two programs.  First, we examine the magnitude of SSI's impact on the net financial benefit 
of delaying the initial OAI claim from age 62 to age 65.  Second, we closely examine patterns of 
initial SSI and OAI claims, paying particular attention to how the age patterns of initial claims 
vary according to social security eligibility status and other characteristics.  Finally, using a 
sample of 62-64-year-old men from multiple SIPP panels, we empirically test the hypothesis that 
SSI program rules hasten the first OAI claim. 
  Because SSI is a welfare program, this topic is of general interest for understanding the 
retirement process of very low-income people (especially its timing) and the potential supports 
                                                 
3 In fact, as Burkhauser and Smeeding (1981) point out, the only way for an SSI recipient to recoup more 
than an insignificant fraction of his social security contributions is by making an early OAI claim.   3   
that enable retirement.  If work plans are made contingent upon the structure of public programs, 
changes to SSER or SSI rules could have a substantial impact on retirement patterns among this 
group.  While the issue of spillovers between programs has been studied in other contexts, it has 
been ignored in the case of SSI and the social security retirement system.
4   
Changes to SSI generosity or social security early retirement rules are predicted to have 
spillover effects on the other program.  Hypothetical examples include an increase in the age of 
early retirement and an increase in SSI benefits.  Since the availability of early OAI allows 
potential SSI recipients to respond to its work disincentives, enhancing the value of SSI 
participation, an increase in the age of early retirement may reduce SSI participation.  Increased 
SSI benefits for elderly recipients might not only increase SSI use but also encourage more early 
OAI claims. 
In fact, policy changes of direct relevance to this issue are occurring, including a change 
in the normal retirement age.  Beginning with the 1938 birth cohort, the normal retirement age is 
scheduled to rise to age 67 for birth cohorts after 1958.  Since the early retirement age will 
remain at 62 indefinitely under current law, this two-year lengthening of the early retirement 
period causes a reduction in the value of the OAI benefit, as the actuarial reduction increases.  
For example, while a worker born prior to 1938 faces an actuarial reduction of 20% of the 
benefit for claiming at age 62 rather than waiting until age 65, a worker born in 1960 faces a 
reduction of 30%.  Our model predicts that such a change will further discourage SSI receipt 
among the elderly.  
The next section presents the relevant institutional detail on the SSI and OAI programs.  
Section III presents the theoretical framework and resulting hypotheses.  Section IV presents 
computations of the financial impact of delaying OAI, based on the complete social security 
earnings records of actual SSI participants.  Section V presents information on the data set and 
                                                 
4 Most of the economics literature on program interactions involving cash welfare has focused on 
Medicaid policy.  Yelowitz (1998) finds that the value of Medicaid increases SSI-disabled participation.  
Blank (1989) and Yelowitz (1995) find evidence that the value of Medicaid also increases AFDC 
participation.  McGarry (1996) finds little influence of Medicaid on SSI-aged participation, however.  
Kubik (1999) and Garrett and Glied (2000) find evidence that households' participation in SSI-disabled is 
related to financial incentives posed by the AFDC and SSI programs. 4   
descriptive information on SSI and OAI use.  Section VI presents the empirical findings from 
specifications of early OAI claims that incorporate information about SSI.  The relevant prior 
literature is discussed at appropriate points throughout the paper.   
 
II.  Program Background 
Social Security  
  The 1935 Social Security Act provided monthly retirement benefits to workers aged 65 
and over and a lump-sum death benefit to the estates of these workers.  Since 1961, men and 
women as young as 62 have been allowed to collect benefits, provided they have accumulated at 
least 40 quarters of sufficient social-security-covered earnings.  The social security benefit is 
based upon a primary insurance amount (PIA) computed from average indexed monthly earnings 
(AIME) for the 35 highest-earning years.
5  An actuarial reduction is applied to the PIA of an 
early retiree to compute his benefit.  If an individual chooses to work and receive a social 
security benefit prior to his full retirement age in the era of our sample, benefits are reduced by 
$1 for every $2 in earnings over a given threshold.  Recently, this reduction was eliminated.
6 
Supplemental Security Income 
  The SSI program was begun in 1974 to provide a uniform federal safety net for the 
elderly and disabled.  The concern of this paper is with the elderly component, which sufficiently 
poor individuals may participate in upon attaining age 65.  While SSI is largely a federal 
program, there is state variation in benefits policy and administration.  The federal government 
sets eligibility criteria and maximum benefit levels for individuals and couples in the federal 
portion of the program.  Since some states (those with more generous safety nets prior to 1974) 
were required, and other states chose, to supplement the basic federal benefit, there is also cross-
state benefit variation.  Wealth holdings also affect eligibility.  In the federal program, couples' 
                                                 
5 While an alternative minimum benefit is still on the books, it was largely phased out by the time of our 
sample.     
6 The threshold at the time of the law change was $9,600.  While Congress ended the so-called "earnings 
test," these benefit reductions were in fact offset by actuarially adjusted benefit increases upon attainment 
of the full retirement age, a feature that was little understood by recipients or policymakers (Gruber and 
Orszag, 1999).   5   
resources–after exclusions of specific items like home equity–may not exceed $2,000; for 
individuals the figure is $1,000 (Social Security Administration, 2001).   
  The federal SSI benefit is generous relative to other welfare programs, and the SSI 
program comprises a potentially substantial source of income for the elderly poor.  Federal SSI, 
when combined with Food Stamps, brings an elderly household's resources close to the federal 
poverty line.  State supplements can also be large.  For example, in January 1991 (within our 
sample period) the maximum monthly federal benefit was $407 for an individual and $610 for a 
couple.  At that time, the highest state benefit for couples was in California, which resulted in an 
increase above the federal level in the maximum obtainable benefit of 55% for individuals and 
91% for couples.   
SSI benefits are reduced with other sources of retirement income.  $20 per month of 
unearned, non-transfer income, $65 of earned income, and one-half of earnings exceeding $65, 
are disregarded in computing the SSI benefit.
7  The disregards are not indexed for inflation, nor 
are they differentiated by household type (couple or individual).
8  The federal benefit is reduced 
by one-third for filing units living in the household of another, and states are free to vary 
supplements according to living arrangements.  We do not consider differentiation in benefits by 
living arrangement (we do differentiate benefits by filing unit type).
9  In most cases, the monthly 
SSI benefit is determined by the formula: 
(1) SSI benefit  = Guarantee - ½ Max{earned income-Min{earned income, $65},0} 
  - Max{unearned income - Min{unearned income, $20},0} 
  - {means-tested transfer income}. 
The guarantee is the benefit amount paid when there is no other income.  Earned income 
refers to the current earnings of the SSI recipient.  Unearned income includes income from 
                                                 
7 In addition, certain home energy and support and maintenance assistance, Food Stamps, most federally-
funded housing assistance, state assistance based on need, one-third of child support payments, and 
income received infrequently or irregularly are excluded.     
8 While some states vary their disregard amounts from the federal level, it proved difficult to incorporate 
this information given the idiosyncratic way in which different disregards are applied and the detailed 
knowledge about income sources that is needed to assign them appropriately.   
9 We provide some descriptive information on living arrangements below.   6   
private pensions, public pensions such as social security, interest income, and the like.  Means-
tested transfer income (e.g., Veterans Benefits) offsets SSI income dollar-for-dollar and none of 
it is disregarded.  These deductions for other income are first applied to the federal benefit 
amount.  When the computed SSI benefit is positive, the filing unit is eligible for the federal 
program.
10  If there is any excess income, it is deducted from the state supplemental payment 
(Social Security Administration, 1994, pp. ii-iii), and the unit only receives a state benefit.   
The number of SSI-aged recipients has been falling over most of the program's history.  
By 1998, 1.4 million elderly people participated in SSI, down from 2.3 million in 1975 (Social 
Security Administration, 1999, Table 7.A3, p. 287).
11  This downward trend, largely completed 
by 1984, is due to the increasing affluence of the elderly, increasing social security coverage of 
this population, and the increasing value of social security benefits claimed.  SSI recipients are 
required to apply for all public benefits for which they may be eligible, including social security, 
and most SSI recipients are eligible for at least a modest social security benefit.  By September 
1993, 65% of aged SSI recipients received social security benefits and 22% received some other 
unearned income.  SSI recipients have little else to rely upon.  Only 2.1% reported any earned 
income, while almost none reported private pension income (1994 Green Book, Tables 6-16 and 
6-17).  By December 1999, slightly less than 60% reported social security benefits, 15.8% 
reported other unearned income, and 1.6% reported earned income (Social Security 
Administration, 2000, Table 7.D).   
  Due to receipt of social security, the average SSI-aged benefit payment actually received 
is fairly low.  In September 1989, the average federal payment to all elderly households on SSI 
was $163, with an average state supplement payment of $133 (49.6% of aged federal SSI 
recipients received a state supplement–1990 Green Book, p. 717).  Zedlewski and Meyer (1989) 
estimate that only about 30% of the elderly poor receive SSI benefits, while McGarry (1996) and 
Warlick (1982) determine that around one-half of potential filing units that appear eligible based 
                                                 
10 People who receive only a state benefit and live in states without federal administration of both the 
federal and state components of the program do not have an administrative record with SSA.    
11 During our sample period, 1984-1996, the SSI-aged caseload is stable, with roughly 1.5 million elderly 
participating each year.   7   
on survey information actually enroll in the program.  McGarry (1996) analyzes SSI 
participation and attributes much of the low take-up by potential eligibles to the quite modest 
cash benefits for which most elderly poor would actually qualify.  
 
III. Modeling SSI and OAI Receipt 
In this section, we lay out the theoretical framework underlying the linkages between SSI 
and SSER.  To illustrate most of our points, we use a simple model in which leisure and 
consumption are choice variables but saving is not allowed.  The results in this case are then 
contrasted with a model in which saving is possible.  Finally, the implications of possible 
extensions to the models are briefly discussed.  The theoretical discussion proceeds in two 
phases.  In the first phase, we review the incentive to participate in SSI and the concomitant 
work disincentives of the SSI program.  In the second phase, we discuss how SSI and OAI rules 
interact in the budget constraint to enhance incentives to claim OAI early.  The technical 
background to the discussion is contained in Appendix A.   
SSI Participation and Work Disincentives 
Consider a simple model in which people live for two periods.  In the first period the 
worker chooses how much to work and consume.  In the second period, consumption is financed 
solely by pension benefits and welfare.  Financial resources cannot be transferred between 
periods.  Pension benefits–which may be from both private and public sources–are determined as 
an increasing function of first-period earnings.  Since all income is consumed each period, once 
the first-period leisure choice is known, the other choices are determined.  First-period work 
hours affect second-period retirement income by increasing social security and private pension 
benefits.     
We introduce an SSI policy into this framework.  An SSI policy is characterized by a 
maximum benefit level (G), an amount of pension income that is disregarded before the benefit 
is computed (D), and a rate at which pension income in excess of D is reduced (in the case of 
SSI, this rate has always been 100%).  In the first period, the person is not age-eligible for SSI.  8   
In the second period, the person is age-eligible and could be income-eligible, so long as 
retirement income is not too high.   
The worker's global optimum is found by considering his actions in each of several 
scenarios.  Each scenario is characterized by the decision to participate in SSI or not and whether 
second-period income is above or below the disregard.  Budget constraints and the first-order 
conditions associated with the local optima are presented in Appendix A.  Work effort is affected 
by SSI policy in determining both local and global optima, and it is straightforward to show that 
a more generous SSI policy discourages work effort, due to the implicit confiscatory tax on 
pension income imposed by SSI in period 2.  In two scenarios, the SSI guarantee has no effect on 
behavior.  First, in the local optimum with nonparticipation, SSI policy is irrelevant.  Second, the 
SSI guarantee has no effect on labor supply in the local optimum where an SSI participant's 
income exceeds the disregard amount.  In this instance, the person's labor supply depends solely 
on consumption needs in period 1, because there is no way to influence period 2 resources by 
adjusting first period labor supply (second period resources are G+D regardless).  Because of the 
inability to transfer resources in this model, the size of the SSI guarantee can have no impact on 
first-period consumption and hence on work decisions.  Finally, in the case of SSI participation 
with income below the disregard, the Appendix demonstrates that labor supply is negatively 
related to the guarantee.     
What is actually observed, of course, is the global optimum.  It is straightforward to 
demonstrate that an increase in the SSI guarantee widens the gap between the lifetime utility 
value associated with SSI-participation versus non-participation outcomes.  Since all choices 
involving SSI participation are associated with lower labor supply, the fact that an increase in G 
widens the portion of the budget constraint over which participation is attractive implies that the 
increase in G will also decrease labor supply globally.   
Incentives to Accelerate the OAI Claim 
Now consider the addition of an early retirement insurance program to this model.  This 
policy is described by a benefit, B0, to which the individual is entitled at the full retirement age in 9   
the second period; an actuarial reduction rate (β) to be applied in the case of early retirement in 
period 1; and an implicit tax rate (τ) on the earned income of early retirees.   
It is evident from examining the budget constraints associated with the various 
permutations of program use that combining SSI participation with an early OAI claim is usually 
advantageous.  When the worker participates in SSI in period 2 (focusing on the simplest case, 
where second-period nonwelfare income will exceed the modest disregard), his total period 2 
resources are determined by the SSI benefit schedule.  There is no advantage to deferring social 
security receipt, because the actuarial benefit reduction for early retirement is effectively 
removed in the second period by the SSI program.  Therefore, the worker's early retirement 
decision is made solely on the basis of whether he can obtain higher utility in period 1 as a 
consequence.  This depends upon the tradeoff between the early retirement benefit, the tax rate 
on earnings (above the disregard) in the OAI program, and the worker's preference for leisure 
versus consumption in period 1.  Appendix A presents the various cases and argues that for the 
sort of low-wage workers who are potentially eligible for SSI-aged, utility is higher when SSI 
use is accompanied by an early OAI claim.  This is obvious in the case where workers are not 
subject to the social security earnings tax: for any choice of work hours, the worker is always 
better off receiving earnings plus the OAI benefit (βB0+wh) rather than earnings alone (wh), and 
in either case second-period consumption will be G+D.   
Because the net government transfer is determined by SSI policy in period 2, early 
retirement is "costless," in the sense that the actuarial reduction in benefits that would normally 
give an early retiree pause are lifted when the second period is reached.  The exception is if the 
individual faces a very low level of retirement income that falls short of the SSI disregard level 
of $20.  In this unlikely event, the agent is in the traditional situation of balancing the benefit of 
receiving some social security benefits today against the lifelong actuarial reduction for early 
retirement.   
Other Considerations and Extensions 
It is interesting to note that incentives for using SSI and SSER are different in a simple 
model allowing saving.  As we have mentioned, SSI has an asset as well as income test.  In this 10   
case, when weighing whether to participate in SSI, the agent decides if it is worth having to 
consume sufficiently more today and consequently less in the future in order to maintain asset-
eligibility for SSI.   
In a model permitting saving but not a choice of labor supply, the effective neutralization 
(after age 64) of OAI's usual actuarial reduction in social security benefits still serves to make an 
early claim more attractive.  However, in contrast to the model just presented, the possibility of 
collecting OAI early cannot alleviate–and in fact serves to aggravate–the problem of 
intertemporal distortion brought about by SSI.  This is because in a model with saving and an 
asset limit in the SSI program, the problem is one of allocating too much consumption to the first 
period in order to meet the asset test.  Not surprisingly then, in a model allowing both labor 
choice and saving, the predicted effect of SSI benefits on labor supply is ambiguous.  While we 
have presented empirical evidence (Neumark and Powers, 1998) that the SSI asset test may 
discourage saving, we believe that the predominant problem individuals face is maintaining 
income just prior to retirement, while responding to the labor supply disincentives of SSI.  In this 
case an early OAI claim is relatively more attractive to those who will be eligible for SSI.  
Ultimately,  this is an empirical question.   
The models discussed to this point simplify but convey the basic insights for 
understanding the interactions of SSI and OAI.  Some potentially important issues cannot be 
addressed easily in this framework.  One possibility is beginning SSI participation after (rather 
than at) age 65, which we only address through the empirical implementation and do not attempt 
to model explicitly.  Similarly, the age of retirement could in principle be treated as endogenous, 
although since labor supply is so heavily taxed by both programs in the sample period, we 
suspect that the essential qualitative predictions would be unchanged.   
In addition, there are several relevant sources of uncertainty, including health, family 
structure, and job stability.  Those facing a high probability of adverse health shocks have a 
greater incentive to ensure SSI eligibility because SSI automatically brings Medicaid coverage.
12  
                                                 
12 However those with sufficient quarters of covered earnings are eligible to purchase Medicare coverage 
at modest premiums after age 65.   11   
In the pre-retirement period, individuals may be uncertain of their future marital status and 
options to continue working.  The prospect of widowhood introduces uncertainty about the size 
of the future benefit payment and consumption needs.  Those facing high probabilities of job loss 
might engage in precautionary saving to prevent a "zero consumption" outcome.  These 
precautionary savings may be sufficient to render them ineligible for SSI (at least at age 65), 
even though others with equal permanent income might make choices that assure SSI eligibility.  
In a world of certainty, people intending to participate in SSI might display low work effort and 
low saving throughout much of their lives.  However, due to uncertainty, people may delay 
committing to an SSI-participation strategy until sufficient information is revealed or, until they 
are reasonably close to the eligibility age.   
Family structure is also ignored in these simple models.  Husbands and wives may 
determine their labor supplies jointly and presumably saving decisions are made collectively.  In 
the "male chauvinist" model (Killingsworth, 1983), the wife regards the husband's labor supply 
(and income) as exogenous to her labor supply decision.  This implies that when analyzing 
married men, we need not be concerned with wives' labor supply.  However, there is some 
evidence against this model, more consonant (in some circumstances) with joint decision making 
(e.g., Lundberg, 1988).  Consequently, we include exogenous factors affecting the wife's labor 
supply in the husband's labor supply specification.   
 
IV.  The Cost of Delaying Social Security Retirement under SSI 
Computations of the financial impact of delaying the first OAI claim give an indication of 
whether the apparent incentives to accelerate retirement imposed by SSI are of practical 
importance.  The approach to computing old age transfer wealth (OATW) is similar to that laid 
out in Diamond and Gruber (1999).  Diamond and Gruber (1999) assume a lifetime earnings 
stream.  To conceptually separate the impact of the OAI claim date from the decision to 
withdraw from the labor market, they assume that individuals receive earnings through age 70, 
regardless of when they initiate OAI.  At each claim date, they compute an expected social 
security benefit using the social security rules in effect for individuals born in 1925 (including 12   
any benefit reductions due to earnings received after the claim) and an assumed earnings 
profile.
13  Next, they discount the lifetime stream of benefits to a base year of 1980 using an 
assumed risk-free interest rate and sex-specific mortality rates.  A maximum life span of 120 
years is assumed.   
In the absence of the complications of SSI policy, there are two direct determinants of the 
cost of delay.  First, benefit recomputation is possible.  By delaying the claim, it is possible for 
current earnings to replace a very low-earning year in the computation of average indexed 
monthly earnings (AIME).  Since the 35 highest years of earnings are used for the AIME 
computation, and the primary insurance amount is a fraction of the AIME, the scope for a 
substantial change in the benefit due to recomputation is quite limited.
14  Only in the extreme 
case of a worker with quarters close to but not yet reaching the coverage minimum of 40, where 
an additional quarter of covered work tips a person's status from OAI-ineligible to OAI-eligible, 
would there be a large impact of recomputation on OATW.
15  Second, to the extent that a 
person's mortality risk exceeds that assumed by SSA, the statutory reduction for early retirement 
is actuarially favorable to the individual.  For example, Duggan and Soares (2002) find that the 
statutory actuarial adjustments for early retirement create incentives for low-income males to 
claim early. 
SSI policy interferes with both mechanisms that determine the gain to delaying the initial 
OAI claim.  This arises directly from the 100% tax on social security income, aside from the first 
$20.  Because of the SSI benefit schedule, once a person enters SSI, their old-age government 
transfer is determined at the margin by the SSI guarantee.  The amount of the social security 
benefit paid to them is rendered nearly irrelevant, since the person's old-age transfer income is 
effectively capped at the SSI guarantee level (plus up to $20 per month from OAI).  Any 
                                                 
13 It is not clear whether they use a representative earnings profile for this particular cohort.   
14 In examples constructed to generate recomputation, the change in the final monthly benefit was usually 
$1 to $2.   
15 Note that this would have a large impact on OATW in a world without SSI, but little impact under SSI 
(since the computation of the SSI benefit gives little credit for past social security contributions).   13   
advantage to recomputation or disadvantage from the actuarial reduction is rendered temporary, 
lasting only from the point of the initial OAI claim until the point of SSI application.  
We are fortunate to have actual social-security-covered earnings histories for most SIPP 
adults.  We therefore use the actual earnings histories for sample members through age 61 as a 
basis for our government benefit computations.  For earnings reported after age 61, a concern is 
that the effects of policy could be introduced into the OATW computations through the 
endoegeneity of labor supply, clouding the interpretation of our results.  Therefore, using the 
CPI-U, we inflate age-61 earnings to extend the earnings profile through age 64.  In contrast to 
Diamond and Gruber (1999), we assume that earnings drop to zero at age 65, rather than at 70.  
This assumption is consistent with observed behavior (as noted, almost no SSI-aged participants 
report earnings) and addresses some practical concerns (chiefly, many individuals who really are 
SSI participants would not be financially eligible were we to assign them hypothetical earnings 
past 64).  It remains the case, as in Diamond and Gruber (1999), that the labor force exit decision 
is held constant throughout the exercise, because we do not examine retirement behavior beyond 
age 65.
16  Finally, we discount the OATW values for our sample members to age 62, rather than 
age 55, using an assumed risk-free interest rate of 3% and sex-specific mortality rates.
17   
We focus on two types of filing units because their OATW can be computed without 
further assumptions.  These are individual male claimants and married couples in which the wife 
does not qualify for her own social security benefit.  To define the samples, we take all men in 
the 1984 and 1990-1996 SIPP panels eligible for OAI by the time they are 62 years old, and who 
appear in the SSI administrative file.  We also drop men born prior to 1920, because they face 
substantially different social security program rules.  For couples, we only examine cases in 
which the wife has fewer than 20 quarters by age 62, so that she is unlikely to qualify for SSI 
                                                 
16 The accurate computation of social security retirement benefits was a key element in this project.  We 
checked our computations by comparing results using a wide variety of earnings profiles for individuals 
and couples to the results of the Social Security Administration's publicly available benefit calculator.  In 
all cases, our calculated benefits came within $1 of the SSA simulator.     
17 Note that we do not think that these mortality rates reflect the private information of our sample 
members very accurately.  The levels of rates of return are not of major interest, rather the difference in 
rates that is generated by introducing SSI policy.   14   
over the relevant time horizon.  The wife receives a spouse benefit under OAI equal to one-half 
of her husband's benefit.   
The findings reported in Table 1 demonstrate that the SSI program dramatically alters the 
financial terms associated with the timing of the first OAI claim.  The top panel shows average 
results for sample members.  The next two panels repeat these figures for the top two-third and 
top one-third of earners in our samples of married and lone men.  At age 65, the social security 
benefit replaces around 60% of average earnings for couples and around 66% of average 
earnings for singles, while the SSI benefit replaces more than 100% of average earnings for 
couples and 91% of average earnings for singles.
18  Because of the progressivity of the SSI and 
social security benefit formulae, replacement rates supported by both programs decline with 
earnings.  
For both couples and singles, in the absence of an SSI program, there is 5% annual return 
to OATW of delaying the initial OAI claim from age 62 to age 65, in the form of increased 
OATW.  For married couples, the benefit from delaying retirement in the absence of SSI grows 
with income (earners in the top one-third of the distribution gain around 6% annually in OATW 
from delaying the first OAI claim), while the cost to delaying retirement under SSI grows also.  
For singles, the gain from delaying retirement for higher earners in the absence of SSI declines 
slightly with rising earnings.  In both cases, once SSI is considered, there would be a minimum 
loss of 2% of OATW per year if the filing unit were to delay their OAI claim to age 65.  
However, as in the case of couples, the loss from delaying the first OAI claim under SSI is 
modestly worse at higher income levels.   
 
V.  Data and Descriptive Information 
Throughout, we use public-use panels from the SIPP that have been matched to SSA files 
by the Census Bureau.  While much of the analysis is restricted to males, we include information 
                                                 
18 One of the characteristics of SSI recipients is that they frequently have many years of zero earnings.  
Since we are using actual earnings records to calculate our figures, we use average indexed monthly 
earnings, suitably deflated, as the denominator for the replacement rates.   15   
about wives that may be relevant for husbands' choices.  In this section, we describe the data 
sources that have been combined for this project and present basic information on how the 
sample members use SSI and OAI.   
Public-Use Data 
  Administrative data are currently available for six SIPP panels, 1984, 1990, 1991, 1992, 
1993, and 1996.
19  The SIPP repeatedly interviews a large, nationally representative group of 
households, typically following them for a period of 2.5 years.  Because SSI serves a fairly small 
number of people, and because our formal empirical analyses are for the restricted age group of 
62-64, the panels are pooled to create our basic sample.  Throughout this paper, males are the 
primary unit of observation.  From the SIPP, we have detailed information on demographic 
characteristics (e.g., birth cohort, race, education, prior marital status), living arrangements, 
general health, and work-limiting disability for each sample member and his spouse.
20  The SIPP 
also collects detailed, self-reported information on public program receipt, including whether 
social security is received, the reason it is received, and whether SSI is received.  Core 
information (i.e., information that is repeated at every interview) is taken from the first interview.  
Health information is from the third interview (one year later).    
Administrative Data 
The Census Bureau matches select SIPP panels to SSA records.
21  We have been allowed 
access to SIPP-matched confidential data on experience in the SSI program (from 1974), social 
security-covered earnings and quarters (from 1951), and OASDI beneficiary information (since 
the early 1950s).  The Census matches the files at the first interview wave, so attrition bias is not 
an issue.  Typically 10% of SIPP adults fail to match to the earnings record database (the 
                                                 
19 1984 is the first SIPP panel.  Panels were not launched in 1994 or 1995.  The SIPP resumed in 1996 
with a much larger panel (and abandoned its overlapping panel design).   
20 We exclude a handful of men from the sample who report they are currently married but who do not 
match to a spouse record in the SIPP.   
21 Once the match is made, observations in the administrative data are assigned their corresponding SIPP 
identifiers.  End users of the data have no access to the social security numbers.   16   
exception is the 1984 panel, where the failure rate is 13%).  Nonmatches are caused by reporting 
or coding errors in the social security number.
22   
The SSI file contains a complete record of case actions since the program's inception in 
1974, including application dates, monthly payment status, and information about the type of 
filing unit to which the individual belongs.  It is SSA's policy to reclassify disabled SSI 
beneficiaries as aged at their 65th birthday.  In addition, since SSI-disabled claims sometimes 
take years to adjudicate, older applicants may find themselves age-eligible for the program 
before their disability claim is resolved.  We are most interested in those who are truly 
participating in the aged component of the program, rather than household units who "age in" 
from the disability program, as the motivations and incentives facing the disabled can be quite 
different.
23  Therefore, we use information on both application and payment dates to determine 
SSI-aged status.  Since the SSA encourages people to contact them several months before they 
hope to receive their first benefit, we define an SSI-aged recipient as a person who applies for 
SSI after his 64th birthday and receives his first SSI payment after his 65th birthday.   
The earnings file contains social-security-qualified earnings by year, as well as a count of 
covered quarters in each year.  We use this information for several purposes.  Covered quarters 
are used to determine the precise OAI-eligibility statuses of men and their wives.  By applying 
social security rules to the earnings records, it is possible to compute the expected OAI benefit at 
various ages and under various assumptions (as was done above to compute OATW under 
alternative scenarios, e.g.).  As noted above, these benefit computations are done with a high 
degree of accuracy.  We use these and other variables constructed from the earnings information 
as key explanatory variables in the regression analyses below.   
The beneficiary file is not as obviously important to the project as the previous two files.  
However, our findings ultimately reveal the value of accessing this information.  Similar to the 
                                                 
22 Communication from Howard Iams, Division of Policy Evaluation, Social Security Administration.  
Any SIPP sample member with a security number appears in the earnings file, regardless of whether they 
have ever worked in covered employment.  In contrast, only actual claimants appear in the SSI and 
beneficiary files.   
23 One obvious difference is that DI claimants qualify with fewer than 40 covered quarters.     17   
case with SSI, the original claims of older individuals who are observed receiving a social 
security benefit can often be traced back to a disability insurance (DI), rather than OAI, claim.  
Retirement beneficiary status is identified by combining information about current coverage type 
with information about past DI benefit receipt.  We identify "early retirees" as those who claim a 
social security benefit prior to their 65th birthday but no earlier than their 62nd birthday, are the 
primary beneficiary (i.e., not a spouse or survivor claiming on another's earning record), are 
classified as an OAI recipient for their most recent claim, and do not have a history of DI claims.   
The use of SSA records greatly enhances the empirical evidence that can be brought to 
bear on this topic along a number of dimensions. While the SIPP is designed to collect 
information on government program receipt, the quality of the data is limited by the accuracy of 
respondents' reports for themselves and others.  Respondents may be especially confused about 
exact beneficiary statuses, conflating retirement and disability, or confusing the SSI and social 
security programs themselves (both are typically administered at the SSA office, after all).
24   
Access to each sample member's SSI history greatly increases the ability to study SSI-
aged participation.  The SIPP time horizon is simply too brief, and the number of SSI recipients 
too small, to observe more than a few entries into SSI-aged in each panel.  In contrast, we can 
use the administrative data to track some sample members for as long as 15 years beyond the 
survey and can observe older members' SSI activity prior to the first interview.   
Finally, it is possible to construct key variables that are simply unavailable in the absence 
of administrative data, such as OAI eligibility, and whether the government old-age transfer is 
more likely to be determined at the margin by the SSI or the social security program.  It is also 
helpful to control for other factors, such as lifetime earnings, that may be highly correlated with 
both an individual's unobserved type and his propensity to use the SSI program. 
  The administrative data are not without limitations.  When disputes or mistakes about 
claims are resolved, the administrative files are altered to reflect the history of SSI and OASDI 
                                                 
24 The distinction between SSI-aged and SSI-disabled may still not be perfect.  For example, a person may 
have received SSI-disabled, made a full recovery, and then come into SSI-aged.  We err on the side of 
treating such a person as "SSI-disabled" since their first payment was received prior to age 65. 18   
receipt for individuals as it should have been, not as it actually unfolded.  This generates errors in 
the recorded timing of payments.  Given our focus on the aged (in contrast to the disabled), 
whose eligibility rules are fairly cut-and-dried, this should not generate substantial errors, 
particularly since we also rely on application dates (which should not have been changed) to 
define SSI-aged status.  Finally, it should be noted that we were only granted access to SIPP-
matched observations, not the universes of SSI clients or social security covered earners or 
beneficiaries. 
Descriptive Information on SSI and OAI Claimants 
  Before proceeding to a formal analysis of the hypothesis, this section presents descriptive 
evidence on the use of SSI and OAI.  The public-use and administrative data are combined to 
investigate the surface plausibility of the hypothesis.  It is documented that a substantial fraction 
of SSI-aged recipients are in fact eligible for OAI at age 62, that a substantial degree of "take-up" 
of SSI occurs very close to age 65, and that SSI recipients are quite prone to claim OAI early.  
  We begin with a large sample of individuals who are either the reference person or 
spouse of a reference person and who are least 30 years old.  Out of this entire group of 168,684 
people, 11,941 (7.1%) ever applied for SSI and 8,141 (4.8%) ever received an SSI payment.  
Information on living arrangements of claimants collected by SSA indicates that 64% are 
individuals, 24.8% live with spouses who also qualify, and the remaining 11% live with spouses 
who do not qualify.
25   
  614 of the men who match to the SSI file meet our strict criteria for "SSI-aged" (the 
payment occurs after the 65th birthday and the application occurs after the 64th).  Most (87%) of 
these men also have some social-security-covered earnings on their record.  Of the group with 
any covered earnings, 61% are OAI-qualified by the time they reach age 62.  Rates of OAI 
coverage of men are much higher than those of women, as one might expect for these older 
cohorts.  Among females classified by SSA as SSI-aged recipients living alone, for example, 
only 40% are OAI-qualified by age 62.   
                                                 
25 This data element represents the most recent ("current") program category and living arrangement.   19   
Using administrative records, we compute the age in months at first SSI application, first 
SSI receipt, and first OAI receipt.  Figures 1a and 1b present age patterns of SSI applications and 
receipts, respectively, for the sample men.  If the process of entering SSI-aged is not very age-
dependent, it is less believable that people use SSI and an early OAI claim in a complimentary 
fashion.  After all, the mechanism that makes the early OAI claim financially attractive hinges on 
the "penalty phase" of the actuarial reduction being as short as possible.   
Figure 1a shows the frequencies of applications and first payments for men by age.
26  
Payments are age-dependent, with a strong spike at age 65.  In fact, the number of people 
receiving their first payment at age 65 is five times larger than the number receiving a first 
payment at age 62, and nearly three times larger than the number receiving a first payment at age 
66.
27  The pattern of applications is smoother, as one might expect, and illustrates why it could 
be misleading to look only at payments over some age ranges.  First payments are more frequent 
once people reach their late 50s.  However, they are not particularly high in their early 60s, and 
again there is a strong spike at age 65.  More importantly, for those receiving a first payment 
after their 65th birthday, these payments are highly concentrated at age 65, rather than being 
dispersed over older ages.  Application and payment frequencies are in fact quite similar after 
age 65.  Most who apply for SSI-aged do not wait long beyond age 65.   
Figure 1b gives a different view of the same underlying data, displaying hazard or "exit" 
rates from the group of individuals who receive or apply for SSI, by age.  At each age, the graph 
shows the fraction of all individuals who will receive or apply for SSI during or after that age, 
and who initiate receipt or an application at that age.  For visual clarity, a narrower age group is 
presented (hazard rates prior to age 45 are quite flat and low).  Again, both payments and 
applications are strongly age-dependent.  There is a modest spike in applications around age 61.  
                                                 
26 Note that this represents all males filing as individuals and most filing units that are couples.  Figures 
1a and 1b are based on samples of 3,340 males with applications and 2,605 males with recorded 
payments.  Women applying as individuals are not represented.  In general, for women filing as 
individuals, there is more first entry into the program at older ages, which may reflect the phenomenon of 
poor widows in this group.   
27 As mentioned, we compute age of first claim by age in months.  For these graphs and frequencies, we 
have rounded this variable down to arrive at the person's age in years.   20   
There are pronounced spikes in both series at age 65.  Over 40% of those remaining who will 
apply do so at age 65, and 56% of those remaining who will receive a payment receive their first 
payment at that age.   
Figures 2a and 2b contrast the age patterns of first SSI receipt for men who are 
categorized as "aged" filing units by SSA, according to whether they are OAI-eligible at age 62 
or not.
28  The motivating idea is to see whether those who would be able to collect OAI at ages 
62 through 64 apply for SSI at earlier ages than those who cannot.  Again, this speaks to the 
plausibility of households using the two programs in a complimentary fashion.  It is evident from 
a comparison of the two figures that the age pattern of first SSI payments for non-OAI-covered 
units is much more dispersed than that for covered filing units.  While a fair number of OAI-
ineligible units receive their first benefits in their 70s, first receipt drops dramatically after age 65 
for the OAI-eligible group.  The fact that there is a much greater age dispersal of first SSI claims 
among the non-OAI-qualified suggests that the SSI claims pattern my not be entirely the result of 
financially desperate households applying as soon as possible.  However, a plausible alternative 
explanation to the hypothesis already proposed is that OAI enrollees, on average, learn about the 
SSI program at earlier ages than non-enrollees.   
Finally, Figures 3a and 3b contrast the OAI receipt patterns of SSI-receiving males in 
aged households with those of other males in the sample.
29  If SSI-aged recipients use OAI much 
like other groups, one reasonably expects little connection between the two programs based upon 
the theoretical arguments presented above.  Figure 3a shows the first age of OAI receipt for a 
"control" sample of low-education men.  Men with less than a high school degree are selected for 
generating the comparison graph, since they may share the problems of lifetime low resources of 
SSI-aged-participating men (in fact, these men have an age pattern of OAI claims that is quite 
similar to that generated by all men in the SIPP).  The distribution has two humps of nearly equal 
                                                 
28 These figures were made using Stata's kernel density graph option, using 209 observations for figure 2a 
and 327 for figure 2b.  While the administrative data should be largely error-free, ages at first 
application/receipt are computed in fractions of years.  Information about, e.g., whether a payment is 
received very close to age 65 or when the individual is nearly 66 is in principle useful and is incorporated 
into these graphs.   
29 Approximately 560 observations were used to generate figure 3a and 420 to generate figure 3b.   21   
height, one at age 62 and one at age 65.  Figure 3b illustrates that the first OAI claims of SSI-
aged men differ dramatically.  The distribution still has two humps, but the age-62 hump is 
nearly twice as high as the age-65 hump.  SSI-aged males claim OAI near age 62 more than 
other OAI-qualified males.   
 
VI.  SSI and the Timing of Initial OAI Claims  
  It is difficult to discern the "strategic" use of OAI and SSI from other reasonable 
scenarios.  A compelling alternative scenario is that some economically vulnerable households 
are extremely reliant on government programs for their income.  They tend to get on OAI as 
soon as it is permitted, and they also tend to enroll in SSI as soon as possible.  Inadvertently, 
their behavior is "smart" in light of the rules and incentives outlined above.  While this may be 
fortunate, this consistency does not imply a conscious design on the part of claimants.   
  Figures 3a and 3b provide some prima facie evidence of accelerated OAI claims that is 
consistent with the hypothesis that people respond to the financial incentives posed by the SSI 
program.  Our first step is to extend this exploration to a regression framework, in order to 
determine whether a variety of observed differences between SSI and non-SSI claimants may be 
associated with the accelerated OAI claims of SSI-aged participants, rather than SSI-aged 
participation itself (this comparison is contingent on both groups being OAI-qualified, of 
course).   
  The choice to initiate OAI prior to the normal retirement age is modeled as a function of 
the financial cost of delay, characteristics governing mortality expectations, earnings, 
preferences, and for married couples, the possibility of coordinating spousal retirement plans.  As 
discussed, in the absence of SSI, the financial cost of delaying the first OAI claim is governed by 
two factors.  These are the individual's relative mortality risk and any benefit increase due to the 
recomputation of the PIA with an additional year's earnings.  As controls for mortality risk, we 
include sample age (62-64), birth cohort (capturing secular trends in health for the cohorts 
covering 1920-1934 in our sample), self-assessed health, marital status (married men have 
significantly lower mortality than their unmarried counterparts), education (better educated men 22   
tend to live longer and have better earnings alternatives), and race (blacks have significantly 
greater mortality risk than whites).  We predict that older men, members of earlier birth cohorts, 
those reporting poor health, unmarried men, less educated men, and black men are more likely to 
make an OAI claim prior to age 65.  We also include the social security replacement rate, 
computed as if the worker retired at age 62, as another indicator of the value of retirement 
relative to continuing to work (we expect those with higher replacement rates to be more likely 
to retire, ceteris paribus).  As noted, benefit recomputation, especially given a person has 
achieved 40 covered quarters before age 62, as in our sample, is not an important consideration.   
After establishing that SSI-aged recipients take OAI earlier, controlling for other 
important factors, we proceed to a test of the behavioral hypothesis that financial incentives in 
the SSI program cause accelerated OAI claims.  We attempt to measure whether an individual 
faces an old-age transfer determined by SSI rules, rather than OAI rules, based on their expected 
social security benefit.  However, the theory indicates that facing an old-age transfer determined 
at the margin by SSI is endogenous with an early OAI claim.  Therefore, we determine the 
relevant portion of the old-age budget constraint that each man faces by computing his social 
security benefit at age 62, assuming no earnings after age 61.  While this overstates the number 
of sample members who are financially eligible for SSI, the variable is exogenous with respect to 
the early retirement decision.  For married men, we construct the combined social security 
benefit for husband and wife and compare it to the SSI benefit for couples to determine 
eligibility.
30  Again to avoid endogeneity with male retirement plans, the variable is constructed 
under the assumption that the wives stop working when their husbands reach age 62.   
Empirical Findings   
Table 2 presents basic findings from probit estimates of four different social security 
receipt variables, ignoring information about the SSI program or SSI use for the time being.  
                                                 
30 We use the spouse benefit (one-half of the husband's), or the wife's own benefit as a worker, depending 
on which is largest.  We also allow husbands to collect a spouse benefit, if this is indicated by a 
comparison of the social security benefits the husband and wife would be owed as workers.  Note that for 
11% of the men in our administrative sample of SSI-aged households (as classified by SSA), the husband 
was eligible but the wife was ineligible.  This should be almost entirely due to age differences, which we 
account for in determining potential filing status.   23   
Most spouse characteristics (including education and health) proved insignificant and were 
dropped from all specifications.  In addition, birth cohort variables were dropped in lieu of panel 
dummies and sample ages, which convey nearly the same information, given the sample 
construction.  The first column of the table contains sample statistics for the relevant variables.  
The next two columns contain coefficient estimates of social security receipt, as self-reported in 
the SIPP.  The last two columns present estimates of early social security and OAI claim 
variables that are constructed from the administrative data.  
Turning to the specifications for self-reported early social security receipt, the second 
column displays estimated impacts of the exogenous variables on the probability that a member 
of the sample currently reports social security benefit receipt prior to age 65, including DI 
receipt.  The third column provides estimates for the current self-reported receipt of a social 
security retirement benefit ("OAI").  The age-62 social security replacement rate (which averages 
42% for the sample) is a negative predictor of early receipt, contrary to expectations.  A 1%-
point increase in the replacement rate results in a 0.29 percentage-point decline in overall social 
security receipt and a half-percentage-point decline in OAI receipt.
31  The likelihood of benefit 
receipt rises with age-in-sample.  Black sample members appear no more likely to collect social 
security by age 64 for any reason, but are 8%-points less likely to collect early OAI (contrary to 
expectations).  There is a pronounced difference between the impact of health on self-reported 
social security versus OAI receipt.  In general, social security receipt pre-age-65 declines with 
improving health status.  However, the qualitative influence on early retirement is quite different, 
with sample members who report fair-to-good health more likely to report OAI benefits than 
those reporting poor health (the omitted category).  Currently unmarried sample members are 
more likely to report any social security benefit and to collect an OAI benefit, as expected.  The 
state unemployment rate has no effect on self-reported receipts.  The effects of educational 
attainment are as expected, with the highly educated (college graduates) much less likely to self-
report social security benefit receipt.  Cohort effects differ from expectations (under the strong 
                                                 
31 The estimated coefficients of the other variables are quite robust with respect to the inclusion of the 
replacement rate variable.   24   
assumption that cohort membership primarily conveys mortality changes).  More recent cohorts 
(as indicated by panel membership) have higher expected participation probabilities.   
In the last two columns, the results for specifications for early (pre-65) social security and 
OAI claims of these same sample members are presented.  In column 3 the findings for a 
specification for a pre-65 social security claim of any kind are presented, while column 4 
presents estimates of an early OAI claim.  Beyond the difference in the time period that the 
dependent variables reference, the findings may differ from those just reported due to SIPP 
respondent misreports, including mistakes about whether the reported benefit is "primary"(that 
is, an entitlement arising from the man's own earning record), and because of imputation 
procedures in the SIPP.   
Age-in-sample should be a randomly distributed variable with respect to the 
administrative variables and it has no explanatory power for these cases, as expected.  The effect 
of the age-62 replacement rate has a still negative but less pronounced effect than that on the 
SIPP-reported dependent variables.
32  The effect of race on early claims is significant, negative, 
and quite similar in magnitude to the previous results.  Overall, health appears more important in 
explaining early social security claims when administrative data are used.  Its influence is 
consistently positive, with those in better health much more likely to claim early.  The fact that 
in-sample marital status, particularly having never been married, has no influence on early 
claims in the administrative record is somewhat surprising, given that these older sample 
members are presumably fairly unlikely to experience a change from never married.
33  As with 
the previous findings, college-degree-holder status reduces the probability of an early social 
security claim of any kind.  Unlike the public-use specifications, panel membership/birth cohort 
has little influence.  Men in the 1993 panel (birth year 1929-1931) are less likely to make any 
early social security claim than those in the 1984 panel (birth year 1920-1922).  The 
                                                 
32 This diminished influence for any early social security claim is not surprising, since the claim may 
occur at any time prior to age 65, including ages far from age 62.     
33 It is possible that its significant effects on the SIPP-generated dependent variables are due to imputation 
procedures or secondary beneficiary status (although it seems implausible that this would be a major 
concern for this sample of older men).   25   
administrative variables do not indicate a cohort trend towards earlier OAI claims, as the public-
use data do.  
Table 3 presents the findings when SSI-participation and policy variables are included in 
the specifications for early OAI claims.  The coefficient estimates of other model variables are 
little changed, and they are not reported.  The effects of three SSI variables on early OAI claims 
are examined:  an indicator that the SSI application was made subsequent to the 65th birthday; 
and indicator that both the first application and receipt occurred after the 65th birthday; and a 
variable indicating whether the household potentially faces an old-age transfer determined by 
SSI policy at the margin, based on a hypothetical social security benefit that is computed 
assuming retirement at age 62.   
Since the SSI-variable coefficient estimates are quite sensitive with respect to inclusion 
of the age-62 social security replacement rate, results for specifications with and without this 
variable are presented.  This sensitivity is not surprising, since the SSI variables tend to reflect 
low lifetime incomes.  Since every sample member is qualified for OAI at age 62, the age-62 
social security replacement rate reflects much of the variation in lifetime earnings in the sample.  
The estimated effects of the SSI-variables are always more positive when the replacement rate is 
included.   
The findings in Table 3 are highly sensitive with respect to whether the public-use or 
administrative information about early social security claims is employed (administrative data 
are always used to construct the SSI variables).  When self-reports of OAI are relied upon, the 
estimated coefficients for SSI-aged applications and recipiency are large (in the preferred 
specification that includes the replacement rate) but imprecisely estimated.  When complete 
information on early OAI claims afforded by the administrative data is used, SSI-aged applicants 
are estimated to be 24% more likely to make an early OAI claim in the preferred specification.  
The coefficient estimate for actual SSI-aged recipients is similarly large, but imprecisely 
estimated.   
While this evidence overall reinforces earlier prima facie evidence that SSI claimants 
tend to accelerate their OAI claims, the final specification (using the exogenous financial 26   
eligibility variable) fails to provide evidence for the hypothesis that they do so in response to 
behavioral incentives.  The final row of Table 3 presents estimates of the influence of the 
variable constructed to be an exogenous measure of whether the government old-age transfer is 
determined at the margin by OAI or SSI rules.  The coefficient estimate is negative when the 
age-62 social security replacement rate is omitted from the specifications, as it also conveys the 
influence of low lifetime income on early OAI claims.  It is insignificant once the age-62 
replacement rate is included.   
Finally, we note that we also attempted to identify the causal influence of SSI on early 
OAI claims using an instrumental variables approach.  The maximum SSI benefit (which varies 
by state and filing unit type) was used as an instrumental variable for actual SSI receipt.  In 
linear probability models, no specifications produced significant estimates of the influence of 
SSI participation on early OAI claims.   
 
VII.  Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper describes the potential interactions of SSI and social security retirement 
program rules and has presents evidence on this issue.  The theoretical presentation demonstrates 
that the combined influence of the two programs ought to discourage work and encourage early 
OAI claims.  Using actual SSI participants' social security earnings records, we demonstrate that 
there is a strong financial incentive to claim OAI early under SSI rules.  The design of SSI 
induces an annual loss in old-age transfer wealth of around 7% when retirement is delayed from 
age 62 to age 65.  
Various analyses of the data reveal that SSI-aged program applicants are likely to claim 
OAI benefits prior to age 65.  SSI-aged participants are much more likely to claim OAI at age 62 
than the population at large according to graphical analyses, and regression analyses indicate that 
SSI-aged applicants are 24% more likely to claim OAI prior to age 65 than men with similar 
family structure, health status, education, and social security replacement rates, among other 
factors.   27   
A formal empirical test failed to support the hypothesis that SSI rules cause increased 
early OAI claims.  While there are various possible explanations for this result, it is important to 
note that identifying a group very likely to be financially eligible for SSI may not take one far 
towards identifying the even smaller group that potentially responds to the program's incentives.  
For example, while 15% of the final analysis sample is financially eligible for SSI at age 65 
(based on their social security earnings records through age 61), only 1% of the sample (about 20 
filing units) actually apply to the SSI-aged program by 2000.  In fact, our ability to detect the 
basic relationships between OAI and SSI use at all in a regression framework, given such a small 
number of relevant observations, appears to be due to our access to very accurate administrative 
information about program use than is typically unavailable.   
While it is plausible that older, impoverished, households claim all public benefits at the 
first available opportunity, the fact that SSI claims are more dispersed by age for non-OAI 
eligibles than OAI-eligibles suggests that simple financial need is not the entire explanation.  The 
provision of information about SSI and encouragement to claim it through interactions with SSA 
may also be an important factor and may put early OAI claimants at an advantage relative to 
other impoverished households.   
Quite aside from behavioral issues, the evidence presented suggests lessons for program 
design.  Welfare systems can unintentionally build in perverse financial penalties when they 
interact with commonly used programs.  While it may be through cleverness or happy accident 
that many SSI claimants sidestep these penalties to some extent (by claiming OAI early), the 
elderly poor who either do not understand these complex relationships, or who do not fall into 
typical patterns of SSI-OAI use, suffer them as a result.  Changes in program design that would 
better integrate SSI and social security, such as giving SSI recipients greater credit for their 
social security contributions (Burkhauser and Smeeding, 1981) would reduce the SSI-induced 
differential in the financial terms of delaying retirement.  Alternatively, if it is thought desirable 
for impoverished groups to rely on government transfers in their early 60s, SSA could advise all 
households with low social security earnings histories of the existence of SSI at that time, rather 
than waiting for such households to initiate their first OASDI claim.       28   
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Appendix A: Theoretical Model 
 
Model with SSI Participation 
 
Let Y0 be the amount of old-age pension income that is predetermined at the beginning of 
period 1.  To simplify, assume Y0 < D (otherwise the worker is automatically ineligible for SSI).  
In the basic no-saving model, the worker's problem is to choose first-period work (h) and 
consumption (c1) to maximize: 
 
u(c1,1 − h) + δv(c2)  . 
 
The budget constraint for period 1 is:  
 
(1) c1 = wh  , 
 
where w is the wage in period 1.  The pension is given by B(wh), with a positive first derivative.  
The budget constraint for period 2 depends on whether the individual participates in SSI, and if 
so whether or not unearned income is below the disregard.  The possible old-age budget 
constraints are: 
 
(2a) c2 =Y0 + G + B(wh) if SSI participant and Y0 + B(wh) < D 
(2b) c2 = G + D if SSI participant and Y0 + B(wh) > D     
(2c) c2 = Y0 + B(wh) if SSI nonparticipant. 
 
Denoting the derivatives of u with respect to its first and second arguments as u1 and u2, 
and the derivative of v as v' (and similarly for second derivatives), the interior local optima 
corresponding to (2a) and (2c) are characterized by:  
 
(3a) u1(wh,1 − h)w − u2(wh,1 − h) + δv'(Y0 + G + B(wh))B'(wh)w = 0 
(3c) u1(wh,1 − h)w − u2(wh,1 − h) + δv'(Y0 + B(wh))B'(wh)w = 0  . 
 
The budget constraint (2b) is horizontal, so that there is no possibility of an interior 
solution along it.  The effects of an increase in G on h along each segment of the budget 
constraint are obtained by applying the implicit function theorem to the local first-order 
conditions for the local optima in h: 
 
(4a)  ∂h/∂G = {−δv''B'(wh)w}/{u11w
2 − u12w − u21w + u22  




−1 < 0 
 
(4c)  ∂h/∂G = 0. 
  
  The first case, while unlikely to arise in practice (because it requires unearned income 
below the very small $20 disregard), can be easily signed.  The numerator is clearly positive 
under the assumption that pension income increases in earnings and strict concavity of second-
period utility, while the denominator is negative under the additional assumption that the first-
order condition of the local optimization problem is downward sloping in h, a standard 31   
assumption.  Therefore, along each segment of the budget constraint an increase in G either has 
no effect on hours or causes a decrease in hours. 
The global solution is found by choosing the level of h that maximizes utility across the 
three choices.  Optimal SSI participation status is then revealed by the global optimum selected.  
The budget constraint (2a) is upward sloping, the budget constraint (2b) is horizontal at G + D, 
and the budget constraint (2c) is upward sloping with the same slope as (2a).  An increase in G 
shifts the budget constraints (2a) and (2b) vertically.  This makes it more likely that someone 
initially on (2c) relocates to the kink point between (2a) and (2b).  No one should ever locate on 
(2b), as it is horizontal.  Someone initially at the kink point between (2a) and (2b) may reduce 
labor supply to the segment (2a).  Thus, labor supply is clearly decreasing in G, and it is 
straightforward but tedious to show, exploiting the first-order conditions and the above 
information about the change in work hours with respect to G, that the relative value of 
participation versus nonparticipation is increasing in G.   
 
Model with SSI and SSER Participation 
 
We introduce an SSER policy, characterized by a full retirement benefit B0, the actuarial 
reduction β for early retirement, and τ, the implicit tax rate on labor earnings while retired.  We 
assume that the worker must begin receiving social security in the second period, if he has not 
elected SSER.  There are two possible budget constraints for period 1, depending on SSER 
participation: 
 
(1a) c1 = wh, if no SSER participation 
(1b) c1 = βB0 + (1 − τ)wh, if SSER participation. 
 
In the second period, the possible budget constraints for SSI nonparticipants are: 
 
(2a') c2 = Y0 + B(wh) + B0, if SSER nonparticipant 
(2b') c2 = Y0 + B(wh) + βB0,  if SSER participant. 
 
Under SSI participation, there are two additional cases, depending on whether income is 
below the disregard ((2c') and (2d')) or above ((2e') and (2f')): 
 
(2c') c2  = Y0 + G + B(wh) + B0, if SSI participant, SSER nonparticipant, and Y0+ B(wh) + B0 <D 
(2d') c2 = Y0 + G + B(wh) + βB0, if SSI participant, SSER participant, and Y0 + B(wh) + βB0 < D 
(2e') c2 = G + D, if SSI participant, SSER nonparticipant, and Y0+ B(wh) + B0 >D 
(2f') c2 = G + D, if SSI participant, SSER participant, and Y0 + B(wh) + βB0 > D  .  
 
Since the cases involving being on SSI but below the disregard rarely apply, we ignore 
them in the following discussion for simplicity.     
  First, it is evident from the budget constraints that in common situations it will be 
advantageous to participate in SSER for local optima associated with SSI participation.  When a 
person participates in SSI, the net government transfer is determined at the margin by SSI 
program rules, so consumption in the second period is G + D regardless of SSER participation.  
Therefore, SSER participation depends entirely on whether the worker obtains a higher period 1 
indifference curve as a consequence.  If the worker in the SSER program is not subject to a wage 32   
tax (i.e., the reduction in benefits for earnings above a particular threshold), clearly he is always 
better off by participating in SSER prior to SSI.  This case is highly relevant for the population 
we study, since given a reasonably generous earnings level before the SSER wage tax sets in, 
many likely SSI recipients will not be subject to the SSER wage tax.  Even for those subject to 
the 50% wage tax, all those with hypothetical earnings in the absence of policy that are below the 
value of twice the SSER benefit plus the entire untaxed earnings allowance in SSER would 
unambiguously choose to participate in SSER prior to participating in SSI.
34   
In the case where the worker is subject to a wage tax, only for workers who would 
optimally choose to earn an amount above their SSER benefit in the absence of the SSER 
program could it possibly be utility-reducing to participate in SSER.  But given the disutility of 
work, this would be the case only for relatively high earners who are unlikely candidates for 
choosing SSI participation as their global maximum.   
                                                 
34 To see this, note that accounting for SSER only, income in the absence of SSER is wh, while income 
with SSER is βB0 + wh − .5(wh − 9600).  (This assumes a wage tax of 50%, and that the threshold at 
which this kicks in is $9600.)  As long as the latter budget constraint is above the former, SSER 
participation will be chosen.  This holds up to the point at which the budget constraints intersect, which is 
at income of 2· βB0 + 9,600.   33   
Table 1:  Impact of SSI on the Financial Terms of an Early OAI Claim 
 
  Married Men    Single Men 
        
       
  without SSI  with SSI    without SSI  with SSI 
All Sample Members       
Annualized return to 
delaying the first OAI 





  0.050    
(0.015) 
-0.020     
(0.005) 
         












          
          
Top Two-Thirds of Earners       
Annualized return to 
delaying the first OAI 
claim from 62 to 65 
0.052 
(0.014) 
-0.024    
(0.008) 
  0.047    
(0.015) 
-0.023    
(0.003) 
         












         
          
Top One-Third of Earners       
Annualized return to 
delaying the first OAI 
claim from 62 to 65 
0.061 
   (0.015) 
-0.027   
(0.010) 
    0.043   
(0.005) 
-0.024    
(0.002) 
         













          
Notes:  Sample men from the 1984, 1990-1993, and 1996 SIPPs who match to SSA administrative files on SSI 
receipt and social security-covered earnings. 
aRatio of the filing unit's age-65 social security benefit to total indexed average earnings, appropriately inflated.  
 
bRatio of the filing unit's SSI benefit to total indexed average earnings, appropriately inflated.  
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  0.242**   
(0.121) 
 
          
SSI-aged recipient  0.0115425   
0.1068 
 0.172   
(0.155) 
 0.261   
(0.164) 
          
Age-62 replacement rate  0.415    
(0.100) 
-0.512*   
(0.132) 
-0.509**   
(0.131) 
-0.243**   
(0.119) 
-0.229***   
(0.119)3 
          





  (0.031) 
0.032  
(0.029) 
0.034   
(0.029) 
          
Age is 64  0.382   
(0.486) 
0.275*   
(0.031) 
0.276*   
(0.031) 




          
Race is black  0.077 
(0.266) 
-0.083***    
(0.047) 






          
Health is fair 
 










          
Health is good   0.318   
(0.466) 
0.082*** 
  0.042 
0.083**    
0.0420 
0.354*   
(0.039) 
0.354*   
(0.039) 
          




0.065   
(0.045) 
0.065   
(0.045) 
0.327*   
(0.042) 
0.327*   
(0.042) 
          
Health is excellent 
 
0.167   
(0.373) 
0.038   
(0.048) 






          
Divorced, widowed or separated   0.127   
(0.333) 
0.195** 
(  0.094) 






          
Never married 
 




0.189***   
( 0.109) 
-0.026   
(0.104) 
-0.029   
(0.104) 
          
State unemployment rate  
 
6.99    
(2.21) 
0.004   
(0.009) 






          
High school graduate only 
 
0.309   
(0.462) 
0.020   
(0.030) 
0.020   
(0.030) 
0.031   
(0.029) 
0.0298994   
0.0287 
          
Some college 
 








-0.0255986   
(0.035) 
          










          






-0.001   
(0.001) 
-0.001   
(0.001) 35   
          
Spouse has 40+ covered quarters  0.663  
(0.472) 
0.025   
(0.027) 






          




0.098***   
(0.051) 
0.057   
(0.048) 
0.057   
(0.048) 
          




0.104**   
(0.047) 
0.066   
(0.045) 
0.0638807   
0.04448 
          






-0.054   
(0.042) 
-0.054645   
(0.042) 
          
1996 panel  0.177    
(0.382) 








          
Social security receipt (SIPP)  0.597  
(0.491) 
    
          
OAI receipt (SIPP) 0.503     
(0.500) 
    
          
Early social security (SSA)  0.668  
(0.471) 
    
          
Early OAI (SSA)  0.652   
(0.476) 
    
          
SSI-aged applicant (SSA)  0.010 
(0.102) 
    
          
SSI-aged recipient (SSA)  0.006 
(0.079) 
    
          




    
          
Number of observations  1906  1906  1906    1906 
Notes:  Sample of SIPP men aged 62-64 who are respondent or spouse of respondent.  A 
constant is included in all specifications.  Men born after 1932 are dropped from the sample.  36   










Age-62 replacement rate  0.415    
(0.100) 




      
Age is 63  0.328   
(0.470) 
0.019    
(0.028) 
0.034   
(0.029) 
      
Age is 64  0.382   
(0.486) 




      
Race is black  0.077 
(0.266) 
-0.086**   
(0.0419 
-0.084**   
(0.043) 
      
Health is fair 
 
0.174   
(0.379) 




      
Health is good   0.318   
(0.466) 




      






0.324*    
(0.041) 
      
Health is excellent 
 






      
Divorced, widowed or separated   0.127   
(0.333) 




      
Never married 
 
0.033   
(0.179) 
0.001   
(0.102) 
-0.027   
(0.1037 
      
State unemployment rate  
 




0.005   
(0.008) 
      
High school graduate only 
 




0.028   
(0.029) 
      
Some college 
 
0.156   
(0.363) 




      
College graduate   0.192 
(0.394) 
-0.100*   
(0.033) 
-0.097*   
(0.034) 
      
Spouse age  49.304  
(22.98) 




      
Spouse has 40+ covered quarters  0.663  
(0.472) 




      
1990 panel   
0.241   
0.050   
(0.047) 
0.060   
(0.048) 37   
(0.428) 
      
1991 panel  0.159   
(0.366) 
0.047   
(0.044) 
0.063   
(0.044) 
      
1993 panel  0.196 
(0.396) 
-0.083**   
(0.042) 
-0.053    
(0.042) 
      
1996 panel  0.177    
(0.382) 




      
Social security receipt (SIPP)  0.597  
(0.491) 
  
      
OAI receipt (SIPP) 0.503     
(0.500) 
  
      
Early social security (SSA)  0.668  
(0.471) 
  
      
Early OAI (SSA)  0.652   
(0.476) 
  
      
SSI-aged applicant (SSA)  0.010 
(0.102) 
  
      
SSI-aged recipient (SSA)  0.006 
(0.079) 
  
      





      
Number of observations  1906  1906  1906 
Notes:  Sample of SIPP men aged 62-64 who are respondent or spouse of respondent.  A 
constant is included in all specifications.  Men born after 1932 are dropped from the sample.  38   


















-0.490*    
(0.130) 




          
Age is 63  0.328   
(0.470) 




0.019    
(0.028) 
0.034   
(0.029) 
          










          




-0.086***   
(0.047) 
-0.086**   
(0.0419 
-0.084**   
(0.043) 
          
Health is fair 
 
0.174   
(0.379) 
-0.113**   
(0.049) 
0.101**   
(0.046) 




          










          




-0.309*   
(0.047) 




0.324*    
(0.041) 
          
Health is excellent 
 
0.167   
(0.373) 
-0.312*   
(0.0495 






          










          
Never married 
 
0.033   
(0.179) 




0.001   
(0.102) 
-0.027   
(0.1037 
          
State unemployment rate  
 
6.99    
(2.21) 
0.007    
(0.008) 




0.005   
(0.008) 
          
High school graduate only 
 
0.309   
(0.462) 






0.028   
(0.029) 
          
Some college 
 
0.156   
(0.363) 








          




-0.134*   
(0.036) 
-0.100*   
(0.033) 
-0.097*   
(0.034) 
          
Spouse age  49.304  
(22.98) 
0.002***   
(0.001) 
0.002   
(0.001) 




          
Spouse has 40+ covered quarters  0.663  
(0.472) 
0.007   
(0.027) 
0.024   
(0.027) 




          
1990 panel   
0.241   
0.099** 
(0.050) 
0.101**   
(0.051) 
0.050   
(0.047) 
0.060   
(0.048) 39   
(0.428) 
          




0.103**   
(0.047) 
0.047   
(0.044) 
0.063   
(0.044) 
          






-0.083**   
(0.042) 
-0.053    
(0.042) 
          
1996 panel  0.177    
(0.382) 
 0.125**   
(0.055) 




          
Social security receipt (SIPP)  0.597  
(0.491) 
      
          
OAI receipt (SIPP) 0.503     
(0.500) 
      
          
Early social security (SSA)  0.668  
(0.471) 
      
          
Early OAI (SSA)  0.652   
(0.476) 
      
          
SSI-aged applicant (SSA)  0.010 
(0.102) 
      
          
SSI-aged recipient (SSA)  0.006 
(0.079) 
      
          




      
          
Number of observations  1906  1906  1906  1906  1906 
Notes:  Sample of SIPP men aged 62-64 who are respondent or spouse of respondent.  A 
constant is included in all specifications.  Men born after 1932 are dropped from the sample.   40   
Table 3: Probit Estimates of Early Claims, Including SSI Variables 
 



















SSI Variables          




  0.208***   
(0.121) 
0.242**   
(0.122) 
          






0.261    
(0.164) 
          






  -0.052***   
(0.032) 
-0.027   
(0.042) 
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Notes:  Source data are men aged 30 or older who are the reference person or spouse of a 
reference person in the 1984, 1990-1993, and 1996 panels of the SIPP.   42   









Figure 2b:  Age at First SSI Payment, SSI-Aged Males Eligible for OAI at Age 62  
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